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 Introduction 
 
Notwithstanding the increasing ‘scientisation’1 of proof as represented by the rapid growth of 
new forms of evidence like CCTV and computer records, and the increasing (and now 
expected)2 use of forensic evidence in criminal cases, the evidence of witnesses who observe 
events and other facts remains crucially important in the criminal justice system. Certainly, 
witness reports are the most common reason for launching police investigations3 and, along 
with confessions, the principal determinant of whether crimes are solved.4  Furthermore, the 
fact that errors of identification always head the list – and by some margin – whenever 
attempts are made to assess the causes of miscarriages of justice,5 provides another reason 
why witness evidence remains of prime importance for evidence lawyers. Ferguson in this 
volume has demonstrated problems that witnesses have in accurately perceiving, 
remembering and recalling the identity of criminal suspects.6 However, another reason why 
witness testimony is so problematic for the criminal justice system is the difficulties jurors 
and other fact-finders face in assessing, not just the accuracy, but also the honesty, of 
witnesses. Thus, another significant cause of miscarriages of justice is the failure of fact-
finders to detect perjury by prosecution witnesses, especially accomplices and others 
testifying in return for favourable treatment.7  
This chapter explores the extent of these difficulties and whether expert witnesses on 
the psychology of witnesses can and should assist fact-finders in improving their evaluation 
of witnesses of fact. At present, the Scottish courts have set their face against allowing 
psychologists and psychiatrists to testify about the general credibility and reliability of 
                                                          
1 MR Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (1997: Yale UP), pp. 143-144. 
2 R Wheate, ‘The importance of DNA evidence to juries in criminal trials’, (2010) 14 E & P 129 on the so-
called CSI effect.   
3 See e.g. PA Tollestrup, JW Turtle and  JC Yuille, ‘Actual victims and witnesses to robbery and fraud: An 
archival analysis’, in DF Ross, et al (eds), Adult Eyewitness Testimony: Current Trends and Developments 
(1994: CUP), 144 at p.152.  
4 PW Greenwood, JM Chaiken, JR Petersilia, LL Prusoff, RP Castro, K Kellen, S Wildhorn The Criminal 
Investigation Process Volume III: Observations and Analysis (1975), ix, chapter 6; M McConville, A Sanders 
and R Leng , The Case for the Prosecution: Police Suspects and the Construction of Criminality (1993: 
Routledge ), p. 57. 
5 Estimates range from around 74-90% of US cases involving post-conviction exoneration through DNA 
evidence:  see KA Findley, ‘Learning from our mistakes: A criminal justice commission to study wrongful 
convictions’, (2002) 38 California Western Law Review 333, pp. 339-340; GL Wells, M Small, S Penrod, RS 
Malpass, SM Fulero and CAE Brimacombe, ‘Eyewitness identification procedures: recommendations for 
lineups and photospreads’, (1998) 22 Law and Human Behavior 603, p. 615. Although Scottish pre-trial 
identification procedures are somewhat better than those in the US, the problems they cause are swamped by the 
impact of inherent limits to witnessing ability: cf C Walker, ‘Miscarriages of justice in Scotland’, in C Walker 
and K Starmer (eds), Miscarriages of Justice: A Review of Justice in Error (1999: OUP), 323, pp. 324-325, on 
Scottish miscarriages of justice. 
6 See chapter….[Editors to complete] 
7 Findley, ibid, pp. 339-340; G Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook 
(2003:Wiley), chapter 7; S Kassin, ‘Judging eyewitnesses, confessions, informants and alibis: what is wrong 
with juries and can they do better?’, in A Heaton-Armstrong, E Shepherd, G Gudjonsson and D Wolchover 
(eds), Witness Testimony: Psychological Investigations and Evidential Perspectives (2006: OUP), 345, pp. 357-
358. 
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witnesses. Such experts (henceforth simply called psychological experts)8 have long been 
allowed to testify where issues of psychology and psychiatry are directly raised, for instance, 
by accused persons denying their fitness to plead or pleading mental disorder or diminished 
responsibility. More recently, as we shall see,9 expert testimony has been admitted on the 
indirect issue of whether witnesses as to facts in issue can be relied on, but only where such 
witnesses have ‘a recognised medical condition’ or other ‘special feature’ which affects their 
ability to provide reliable evidence.  
In all other cases of witness reliability and credibility, the High Court has 
authoritatively declared in Gage v HMA10 that such evidence is inadmissible as it is not 
‘necessary for the proper resolution of the dispute’ and for jurors or other fact-finders to 
reach ‘a sound conclusion’. This is because, as Lord Gill put it, relying on both reasons of 
alleged fact and legal policy:  
 
‘Questions of credibility and reliability are pre-eminently matters for the tribunal of 
fact. Our system of jury trial proceeds on the basis that jurors, as people of ordinary 
intelligence and experience, are capable of assessing the credibility and reliability of a 
witness without expert assistance. For opinion evidence to be admissible ….[it] must 
not usurp the function of the jury’.11  
 
In addition, Lord Gill pointed to two other sets of reasons for the categorical exclusion of 
expert testimony on ‘normal witnesses’. The first, which seems to contradict the assumptions 
about fact-finders’ evaluation abilities to discern witness unreliability,12 involves the already 
existing safeguards against unreliable evidence, namely judicial warnings to juries about 
potentially unreliable evidence which refer to specific considerations that might affect its 
reliability as well as defence lawyers highlighting potential problems in cross examination.13 
The second involves the worry that expert testimony on witness psychology will lead to trials 
being inordinately prolonged and degenerating into battles of the experts, which might create 
a ‘climate of disbelief’ about witness testimony and distract jurors from making a ‘proper 
appraisal’ of witnesses.14 
 This chapter has three aims. The first is to question the empirical validity of the High 
Court’s faith in the ability of fact-finders to reach sound conclusions about witness credibility 
and reliability and in existing safeguards against them making mistakes, and its assumption 
about the dangers of psychological experts. Secondly, it questions the High Court’s adoption 
of an admissibility test for expert evidence. Finally, it argues that the law should instead 
embrace a test of helpfulness or assistance and, illustrates how such a test incorporates all 
relevant admissibility enquiries. These include the additional two reasons Lord Gill gives for 
excluding psychological experts, as well as the very recently introduced requirement that 
                                                          
8 Given that psychology is concerned with both healthy minds and those afflicted by various problems, whereas 
psychiatry is only concerned with the latter: FE Raitt and MS Zeedyk, The Implicit Relation of Psychology and 
Law: Women and Syndrome Evidence (2000: Routledge), pp. 16-17. 
9 Section A.4.  
10 [2011] HCJAC 40; 2011 SCL 645, discussed by A Roberts, ‘Expert evidence on the reliability of eyewitness 
identification – some observations on the justifications of exclusion: Gage v HM Advocate’, (2012) 16 E & P 
93. 
11 [2011] HCJAC 40, para. 21.  
12 E Stein, ‘The admissibility of expert testimony about cognitive science research on eyewitness identification’, 
(2003) 2 Law, Probability and Risk 295, p. 298. 
13 [2011] HCJAC 40,  paras. 29-30.  
14 Ibid, para. 32.  
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expert testimony is based on ‘a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.15 Combining both 
these empirical and legal questions, we argue that the categorical rejection of all expert 
evidence on the credibility and reliability of witness testimony is not justified, but nor is an 
approach which admits all such evidence. Instead, admissibility should depend on weighing 
up a variety of contextual and legal factors relating to the content, function, value and 
reliability of expert evidence, the relevance of which will emerge in the course of our critique 
of the Gage decision.  
   
A. THE LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
  
1. The necessity test: built on shaky foundations 
 
Prior to Gage, no Scottish case had discussed any distinction between necessity and 
assistance as tests for the admission of expert evidence. With physical evidence, even of a 
novel nature, no such test was mooted because it was always assumed that such expert 
testimony was necessary since fact-finders will not know about DNA, ballistics and the like 
unless explained by an expert. It seemed equally clear that evidence about a medical 
condition or illness affecting the mind requires to be explained by someone with relevant 
professional knowledge. Consequently, psychiatrists and psychologists were allowed to give 
expert evidence where witnesses were subject to some form of ‘abnormality’. In Gage, 
however, the proffered expert evidence related to the witnessing ability of a ‘normal’ witness, 
and for the first time the Scottish courts explicitly adopted an admissibility test of necessity 
rather than the helpfulness test argued for by defence counsel and assumed by one of the few 
commentators to touch on the issue.16 According to Lord Gill a helpfulness test was ‘not 
supported by authority’ and was ‘unworkable in practice’.17 No justification was given for the 
latter point, but in support of his adoption of a necessity test, Lord Gill quoted the leading 
English case of R v Turner in which Lawton LJ famously stated that: 
  
‘An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which 
is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven 
facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of 
an expert is unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it 
may make judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness has impressive 
scientific qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of 
human nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than that 
of the jurors themselves; but there is a danger that they may think it does.’18 
 
However, it is not clear that Lawton LJ intended to lay down a necessity test. He refers to the 
expert being ‘helpful’ and thus could be said to be saying that expert evidence which is not 
helpful is not necessary, but that which is helpful is necessary. Indeed, in England and Wales 
the Turner test has been interpreted as one of ‘helpfulness’19 (which incidentally has been 
taken to apply to all expert evidence rather than just that of psychologists). Consequently, it is 
                                                          
15 Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP [2016] UKSC 6; 2016 SLT 209, para. 44. See also Young v HM Advocate 
2014 SLT 21; 2014 SCL 98 and the discussion below.  
16 ID MacPhail, Research Paper on the Law of Evidence of Scotland, (1979) Scottish Law Commission, para. 
17.06. 
17 Gage, para. 22 
18 [1975] QB 834, p. 841, quoted in Gage, para. 25. 
19 See, for example, P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, (2nd edn, 2010: OUP), pp. 486ff.   
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arguable that Lord Gill’s approach in Gage was based on a misreading of Turner. Moreover, 
it is out of line, not just with English, but also US20 and Australian, law.21  
 Indeed, in Scotland there have been recent signs of a more liberal helpfulness or 
assistance test, albeit not specifically in relation to expert evidence on the credibility or 
reliability of witnesses. Thus in Young v HM Advocate22, a case involving proffered 
psychological evidence on case analysis linkage, a form of offender profiling, the High Court 
stated that: 
 
‘Evidence about relevant matters which are not within the knowledge of everyday life 
reasonably to be imputed to a jury or other finder of fact may be admissible if it is likely 
to assist the jury or finder of fact in the proper determination of the issue before it.’ 23 
(emphasis added).  
 
Admittedly, the possibility of a more stringent necessity test had not been raised and 
therefore the helpfulness test cannot be said to have been expressly adopted. Moreover, the 
Scottish courts have always taken a more liberal approach to psychological experts whose 
testimony relates to ‘the proper determination of the issue’ before the court, rather than 
credibility and reliability of specific witnesses. On the other hand, no Scottish court has ever 
suggested that different types of evidence demand different admissibility tests. Instead, the 
dicta suggest a single test; it is just that it is bypassed where it is clearly met and only 
discussed in cases of doubt.   
 Nor should it be thought that the distinction between a necessity and helpfulness test 
is merely one of semantics. Helpfulness denotes something that the jury can manage without, 
but which enables them to do a better job. Necessity, on the other hand, involves a categorical 
distinction – evidence is either necessary or it is not – and a necessity test is far more difficult 
to satisfy. Courts which are keen to exclude certain types of expertise are thus more likely to 
adopt a necessity test, as the High Court did in Gage, presumably motivated by the desire to 
uphold the fact-finding authority of the jury, and that of all fact adjudicators, and perhaps also 
to resist the suggestion that for centuries courts have made unsound decisions about 
witnesses.   
  
2. Opinion versus social framework evidence 
 
That the distinction between necessity and helpfulness is significant was implicitly 
recognised by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP,24 a Scottish personal 
injury appeal, which has further eroded the reach of the Gage necessity test. Here, the 
correctness of a necessity test was specifically raised and was expressly limited by the Court 
to experts who give opinion evidence rather than the separate category of  ‘skilled evidence 
of factual matters, in which he or she draws on knowledge that is not derived solely from 
personal observation or its equivalent.’25 Although the Court did not define the difference 
                                                          
20 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702. 
21 See, for example, Murphy v R [1989] HCA 28; Thirukkumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs [2002] FCAFC 268 (2002), para. 33. In fact, here legislation has expressly provided that opinion 
evidence is not inadmissible only on account of the fact that it is about ‘a matter of common knowledge’: see, 
the Victorian Evidence Act 2008, s. 80(b). In Canada the Supreme Court moved in R v Mohan [1994] 2 S.C.R. 
9.  from the previous ‘helpfulness’ test in R v Abbey  [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24.  to one of necessity, despite both cases 
having been based on Turner. 
22 [2013] HCJAC 145; 2014 SLT 21; 2014 SCL 98. 
23 Ibid, para. 54.   
24 [2016] UKSC 6; 2016 SLT 209.  
25 Ibid, para. 41. 
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between these expert functions,26 from the examples given of the latter (engineers describing 
how machines are configured, how motorways are built) and from the application of the law 
to the facts, it seems to have distinguished an expert who merely provides background 
knowledge which assists a court in making a decision on proffered facts in issue from an 
expert who goes further to suggest what inference should be drawn from the proffered facts. 
In the case of the former the Court held that the admissibility test ‘cannot be strict necessity 
as, otherwise, the court could be deprived of the benefit of a skilled witness who collates and 
presents to the court in an efficient manner the knowledge of others in his or her field of 
expertise.’27   
While Kennedy did not involve psychological experts, there is nothing to suggest that 
the Supreme Court only intended its distinction to apply to the health and safety experts 
involved in that case. The Court did acknowledge that it has no jurisdiction to lay down a test 
for criminal cases,28 but equally there seems to be no justification for a different approach in 
criminal cases from that used in civil cases. Prima facie, this suggests that the Scottish courts 
may, in future, be prepared to apply a weaker assistance or helpfulness test where, as often 
occurs in the US,29 psychological experts merely testify as to relevant research findings on 
the accuracy of witness accounts without giving an opinion on the likely accuracy of the 
witnesses at trial. This is sometimes called ‘social framework evidence’30 because it provides 
evidence as to the social and psychological context relevant to the actions and state of mind 
of legal actors, thus enabling fact adjudicators ‘to arrive at a more informed interpretation of 
the facts.’31 Social framework evidence thus plays the same role as generalisations about how 
the world works in providing the necessary basis to draw inferences from facts. In other 
words, just as fact-finders are enabled to make inferences from facts based on knowledge 
provided by an expert about how machines are configured, so are they enabled to draw 
inferences from knowledge provided by an expert on how minds are configured. Social 
framework evidence is clearly far less problematic as regards Lord Gill’s concern regarding 
the usurpation of juries and other fact-adjudicators because it leaves them far freer to draw 
their own inferences from the witnesses’ testimony than the more definitive opinion of an 
expert.  
Moreover , it remains unclear how Kennedy can be reconciled with Gage. Certainly, if 
they conflict, Gage is the authoritative criminal law case and there are hints of Lord Gill’s 
resistance to even the provision of skilled evidence of fact relating to the reliability of 
witnesses. Thus, he stated: 
 
‘In all of the cases in which expert evidence has been admitted in our courts, the 
evidence was specific to the facts of the case, and usually specific to a particular 
                                                          
26 This distinction is recognised in England where it has statutory status in civil cases: Civil Evidence Act 1972, 
s. 3, a provision not mentioned in Kennedy. 
27 [2016] UKSC 6; 2016 SLT 209, para. 46.  
28 Ibid, para. 37.  
29 See for, example, People v McDonald, 37 Cal3d 351 208 Cal Rptr 236 (California Supreme Court) 1984, 371; 
US v Downing, 753 F2d 1224 (3d Cir 1985); US v Smith, 736 F2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir 1984); USv Stevens, 935 
F2d 1380, 1397 (3d Cir 1991); US v Mathis, 264 F3d 321, 333; US v Smithers, 212 F3d 306, 314 (6th Cir 2000). 
30 The concept was introduced by L Walker and J Monahan,  ‘Social frameworks: a new use of social science in 
law’ (1987) 73 Virginia L Rev 559 and while usually associated with various means to counter myths about 
rape, domestic violence, etc it is also regarded as applying to witness testimony: Raitt and Zeedyk, The Implicit 
Relation p. 177.  There is some indication that such evidence may be accepted in England too, even on 
credibility issues – in R v S [2006] EWCA Crim 2389, the Court of Appeal declared psychological evidence of 
the general functioning of autistic children was admissible (although a general rule was not explicitly laid 
down). Such evidence was also admitted on early memories in R v JH, TG [2005] EWCA Crim 1828. 
31 FE Raitt, ‘Expert evidence as context: historical patterns and contemporary attitudes in the prosecution of 
sexual offences’, (2004) 12 Fem LS 233, p. 236.  
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witness. Professor Valentine has conducted no case specific tests or research. He can 
only alert the court to some of the factors that might in general affect the reliability of 
identification evidence. Much of his report has no bearing on the facts of this case.’32 
 
However, it is not clear whether he is suggesting a blanket ban on ‘social framework 
evidence’ relevant to witnesses, reinforcing the need for special features on the part of the 
witness in question, or upholding the general requirement that all expert evidence must be 
relevant to issues at stake,33 or simply supporting his conclusion34 that: ‘[i]t is not for 
Professor Valentine now to offer a view on whether a particular witness was reliable.’35 
Nevertheless, whatever the exact import of Lord Gill’s comments, and their relation to the 
distinction made in Kennedy, the latter does provide some support for a more liberal test of 
the admissibility of expert evidence on witness psychology.  
 
 3. Credibility versus reliability 
 
Additional support may be derived from another distinction overlooked in Gage – and indeed 
all modern Scottish cases – which can also be used to challenge the court’s categorical 
approach to the exclusion of psychological evidence on witnesses without ‘special features’. 
Like all other relevant cases, Gage conflates the credibility and reliability of witnesses 
without recognising an important distinction between them pertaining to the admissibility of 
psychological experts. In ordinary language, which is consistent with the apparent 
understanding of some writers36 and courts37 on the rare occasions where they discuss the 
concepts,38 the term ‘credibility’ is used to refer to the question of whether someone is telling 
the truth and ‘reliability’ to whether their honest testimony is likely to be accurate. No 
Scottish evidence text since 1825 has discussed these concepts in much detail.39 Sometimes, 
credibility is said to include reliability questions, and sometimes, even in the same breath, 
given its own heading.40  However, there is another, overlapping but different distinction 
                                                          
32 Gage, para. 36. Evidence of a similar kind was offered in Snowden v HMA 2014 SCL 736, and was excluded 
on the application of Gage - see para. 67. 
33 Though here he only said that ‘much’ of the evidence has no bearing on the case. 
34 Gage, para. 35. 
35 If Lord Gill meant this, it is not controversial either in Scotland (Wilson and Murray v HMA [2009] HCJAC 
58; 2009 JC 336) or in England and Wales (R v H (Stephen) [2014] EWCA Crim 1555). 
36 See ML Ross and J Chalmers, Walker and Walker: The Law of Evidence in Scotland (4th ed. 2015: 
Bloomsbury) para. 12.9.3; FE Raitt, Evidence: Principles, Policy and Practice, (2nd ed. 2013: Thomson/W. 
Green), paras. 12-19; AN Brown, Criminal Evidence and Procedure: An Introduction, (3rd ed., 2010: 
Avizandum), 4; M Stone, Cross-Examination in Criminal Trials, (3rd ed., 2009: Tottel) , chapter 3 (reliability) 
and 4 (credibility), and M Stone, Proof of Fact in Criminal Trials (1984: W. Green), chapters 2-5 passim. Early 
evidence writers tended to concentrate on the motivations which might lead to a lack of credibility and on prior 
inconsistent statements, and rarely discussed concepts such as demeanour or how a witness’s credibility is 
assessed based on testimony: see, for example, WG Dickson, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Scotland, 
(3rd ed., 1887, Vol II, Title II: Bell and Bradfute), paras. 1616-1634, but cf WJ Lewis, Manual of the Law of 
Evidence in Scotland (1925: W Hodge & Co.), p. 253.  
37 For example, Dickson J. in the Supreme Court of British Columbia (Gilbert v Bottle 2011 BCSC 1389 at para. 
9) stated: ‘ … truthfulness and reliability are not necessarily synonymous. A witness may sincerely attempt to be 
truthful, but lack the perceptive, recall or narrative capacity to provide reliable testimony on a given matter.’ 
38 Cf ID Macphail, Scottish Criminal Evidence: Procedure and Practice (2012: Avizandum Publishing Ltd.) , 
para 4.10, noting that credibility and reliability are matters ‘about which law of evidence textbooks have 
traditionally had little to say’. 
39 See Bentham’s discussion of credibility and reliability, the latter in terms of perception, judgement, memory, 
expression and imagination: J Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence (1825: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy), p. 
21.  
40 See, for example, E Bell, ‘An introduction to judicial fact-finding’, (2013) 39 Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 
519, p. 525. 
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which relates more closely to the reason why courts may want to exclude expert evidence on 
witness psychology: the difference between credibility and reliability. This was recently 
highlighted by the High Court in Jenkins v HMA,41 albeit in relation to the finality of a jury’s 
decision on appeal. Thus, having stated that questions of credibility and reliability are 
normally to be regarded as quintessentially jury questions (emphasis added), Lord Clarke 
went on to say that: 
  
‘… it is important to have in mind that while questions of credibility and reliability 
are said often to shade into each other, they are distinct concepts.42 A witness may 
come across as entirely credible but, on reflection, be held to be unreliable. A person 
who is credible is one who is believed. A person who is reliable is one upon whom 
trust and confidence can be placed. Credibility may be judged on the moment, 
whereas reliability may be only capable of being addressed having regard to the 
person's “track record”, so to speak.’43 
 
If credibility, unlike reliability, is something which is judged ‘in the moment’, we can see 
why courts would not want to allow experts to opine on credibility. Credibility is purely 
about what witnesses say and how they present themselves in the witness box. It is about 
consistency, confidence, hesitancy, demeanour and reaction under pressure. The common law 
has always assumed – albeit not entirely correctly, as we shall see44 – that these matters can 
be evaluated by the jury and other fact-finders as well as by anyone.45 Consequently, it is no 
surprise that, in terms of the importance of orality and lay adjudication, credibility has been 
regarded as a matter entirely for the fact-finders’ common sense and past experiences of those 
who turned out to be lying or mistaken.  
 Over time, however, this understandable approach to credibility seems to have been 
extended to the different and much less discussed question of reliability, without any apparent 
realisation that reliability is different from credibility and that different considerations might 
apply. Jenkins seems to suggest that reliability is solely about a witness’s propensity and 
ability to give testimony that can instil ‘trust and confidence’ in the decision- maker. As 
Ferguson’s chapter makes clear, there are many other reasons why witnesses might not be 
reliable, flowing from, for instance: 
 the conditions under which facts are observed (for instance the duration of 
observation, distance between witness and events, visibility, whether line of 
observation impeded, whether the perpetrator was known to the witness),  
 the nature of the facts themselves (violent versus non-violent events, rapidly changing 
or static facts),  
 when and how recall is elicited,  
 the abilities of the witness (as affected, for instance, by age, vulnerability, illness and 
intoxicants).  
Indeed, if credibility relates to ‘in the moment’ evaluations of witness honesty in terms of 
factors internal to the testimony, reliability can be said to involve all factors external to the 
                                                          
41 [2011] HCJAC 86; 2011 SCL 927. 
42 See also the Scottish Jury Manual: Judicial Studies Committee, Jury manual: some notes for the guidance of 
the judiciary, 2012, para. 2.1.1.  
43 [2011] HCJAC 86; 2011 SCL 927, para. 44. 
44 Section B below. 
45 Cf Lord Justice-General Cullen in MacKay v HMA 2005 1 JC 24, para. 8, who stated that at least one reason 
why ‘[e]xpert evidence may be given … as to the existence in a witness of a medical, psychiatric or 
psychological condition which could account for the witness giving an untrue account … is that it relates to 
matters which a jury do not have the opportunity to investigate or the expertise to diagnose.’ (emphasis added).  
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testimony affecting the capacity,46 propensity and ability of the witness honestly and 
accurately to recall relevant facts. To allow expert evidence on reliability would thus not 
involve experts testifying as to whether witnesses are honest but rather whether their 
testimony can be trusted, given certain factors external to their testimony.47  Jurors will have 
seen and heard the testimony for themselves, and will have considered any non-expert attacks 
on reliability. They will have heard the rest of the evidence too, enabling them to assess 
witness testimony in the context of the whole case. Jurors will have been directed on issues of 
reliability and credibility. They will then put all of this together (including the expert’s 
contextual reliability evidence) in order to make a decision on reliability. It is simply 
inaccurate, then, to refer to the psychologist ‘substituting’ the common sense of the jury,48 
and it is equally wrong to refer to ‘trial by psychiatrist’,49  because the expert evidence simply 
gives the jury more information to make their assessment of the reliability of the witness’s 
evidence. This is especially so when one considers the law’s acceptance of what can, with 
more justification, be called ‘trial by forensic scientist’ which happens whenever full legal 
proof is constituted, for instance, by DNA or fingerprint evidence alone.50 Moreover, the 
impact of such scientific evidence is more powerful on fact-finders as it points directly to 
guilt and comes from  the more socially authoritative ‘hard’ sciences,51 whereas 
psychological expert testimony on reliability evidence merely offers assistance to the jury on 
how reliable evidence pointing to guilt is likely to be. 
  
4. ‘Special features’ versus ‘normal’ witnesses 
 
That the law does, in fact, take a more permissive approach to expert evidence on reliability 
(as opposed to credibility) can be seen from greater judicial and legislative willingness to 
allow psychological experts on reliability of witnesses. Thus, mirroring the English and 
Welsh courts’ approach to the alleged ‘abnormality rule’ laid down in Turner,52 the Scottish 
judiciary has gradually expanded the qualification to the prohibition on psychological 
evidence on witnessing to the effect that it only applies to ‘ordinary and normal’53 witnesses. 
At first this qualification was confined to testimony on witnesses suffering from a ‘mental 
illness’,54 ‘objective medical condition’,55 or ‘medical, psychiatric or psychological 
condition’.56 Then it was extended, as noted in Gage,57 to witnesses with ‘special features’58 
                                                          
46 Cf Gilbert v Bottle 2011 BCSC 1389,  para. 10,  which refers to capacity. 
47 Cf McBrearty v HMA 2004 JC 122; 2004 SLT 917, per LJC Gill, para.49. 
48 R v Turner [1975] QB 834, p. 843. 
49 Ibid. 
50 For example, only recently have the Scottish courts had to consider some of the arguments around the 
reliability of DNA evidence: McGartland v HMA [2015] HCJAC 23; 2015 SCCR 192; 2015 SCL 471; Dunbar 
v HMA [2015] HCJAC 22; 2015 SCCR 186[please check]; 2015 SCL 465; and Reid v HMA [2016] HCJAC 41; 
2016 SCL 448. 
51 For a critique of the hard/soft science distinction, see, for example, DL Faigman, ‘To have and have not: 
assessing the value of social science to the law as science and policy’, (1989) 38 Emory Law Review, 1005. 
52 See for example Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, p. 487 describing the ‘abnormality rule’ as 
‘nothing more than an eminently defeasible presumption about the type of evidence jurors usually find helpful’.  
53 Grimmond v HMA 2002 SLT 508, para. 11.  
54 Ibid, holding that evidence that the complainer was a pathological liar would have been admissible had this 
been the case.  
55 McBrearty, para. 49. This view has persisted even after the advent of the ‘special features’ test, which is 
clearly wider: see the comments in M v HMA (No.2) [2013] HCJAC 22; 2013 SLT 380, paras. 38-39.  
56 Mackay v HMA 2004 SCCR 478, para.8. 
57 [2011] HCJAC 40, para. 17. 
58 In HMA v A 2005 SLT 975 where evidence from a psychiatrist that a complainer suffered from ‘false memory 
syndrome’ was admitted because she was in ‘a complex mental state that was likely to be outside the experience 
of the members of a jury’, per Lord Macphail, para. 15. 
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and increasingly over the years, such ‘special features’ have moved further away from an 
association with abnormal mental conditions.  
Thus in Blagojevic v HMA59 the court made clear that it would have allowed a clinical 
psychologist to testify that the accused had a tendency, under stress, to be suggestible had the 
accused laid the necessary foundation in fact by giving evidence. Then, in Gilmour v HMA,60 
another case on confession reliability, a forensic psychologist was allowed to testify that 
according to tests he had developed, the accused was highly suggestible and highly compliant 
at the time of his interview.61 No attempt was made to link this to a diagnosable medical, 
psychiatric or psychological condition or even some other special feature such as low IQ.62 
Further support for the ever widening ambit of special features derives from AJE v HMA63 in 
which a social worker who was present at the interview of two children alleging rape had 
testified that in her opinion they could give reliable evidence of sexual abuse despite denials 
and inconsistencies in prior statements. All three judges regarded the evidence, which had not 
been objected to at trial, as problematic, but seemed to be more exercised by the social 
worker’s lack of relevant expertise than the fact that she was commenting on reliability64 and 
in fact Lord McCluskey stated that the evidence of a child psychologist in this case would 
have been admissible.65 Moreover, the High Court was also critical of the trial counsel’s 
decision not to adduce evidence of a report from a forensic criminologist on the techniques 
used to interview children effectively, clearly thinking that such evidence would have been 
admissible.66 It could be argued that children occupy a special group, but the courts in these 
cases do not indicate that this is the case, and an age-based approach could, at least to some 
extent, apply to the elderly. 
Finally, in Campbell v HMA,67 the High Court condoned the admission of the 
evidence of a forensic linguist and a cognitive psychologist called to establish the extreme 
unlikelihood of the accounts of various police officers (in noting a short incriminating 
statement) converging on a verbatim basis, and hence that they must have colluded in 
compiling the statements in their notebooks, despite their denials at the original trial. There 
was no suggestion that the police witnesses were anything other than of ‘ordinary and 
normal’ mind or particularly susceptible to pressure because of ‘special features’. This latter 
requirement seems to have simply been ignored in favour of admitting relevant and useful 
evidence by psychological experts.  
 Such an approach is also endorsed by Parliament. Thus, s. 275C of the Vulnerable 
Witnesses (Scotland) Act 1995 makes admissible ‘[e]xpert psychological or psychiatric 
evidence relating to any subsequent behaviour or statement of the complainer … for the 
purpose of rebutting any inference adverse to the complainer's credibility or reliability as a 
                                                          
59 1995 SLT 1189. See Lord Justice General Hope, p. 1192. 
60 [2007] HCJAC 48; 2007 SLT 893. 
61 But cf Wilson v HMA [2009] HCJAC 68; 2009 JC 336, where the High Court adopted a less charitable view 
of Professor Gudjonsson’s evidence because it was regarded inter alia as addressing the ultimate issue.  
62 Cf Hodgson v HMA [2012] HCJAC 55; 2012 SCL 817, where evidence of psychologists on the very low 
(borderline) IQ of the complainer was allowed to explain the complainer’s difficulty in discussing sexual 
matters; LB v HMA 2003 JC 94, where no objection was taken to using expert opinion on the impact of low IQ 
on the ability to understand the caution.  For a discussion of some of the English cases on IQ and the artificiality 
of distinguishing  between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ witnesses, see RD Mackay, and AM Colman, ‘Excluding 
expert evidence: a tale of ordinary folk and common experience’, [1991] Crim LR 800.  
63 2002 JC 215.  
64 Ibid, per Lord Justice Clerk Gill, paras. 13 and 14; Lord Hamilton, paras. 12 and 13; Lord McCluskey, para. 
18 
65 Lord McCluskey ibid. para. 18. 
66 See Lord McCluskey’s comments, ibid, para. 18 and HMA v G 2010 SLT 239, para. 17 where Lord Brodie 
appears to have considered expert evidence on child interviewing techniques to be admissible, in principle. 
67 2004 SLT 397; 2004 SCCR 220. 
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witness which might otherwise be drawn from the behaviour or statement.’ While admittedly 
very narrow in being confined to the evidence of complainers in sexual offence charges, this 
provision indicates that Parliament does not always regard the admission of testimony of 
psychological experts as an unjustified usurpation of the role of the jury and other fact 
adjudicators68 in the absence of special features of witnesses. 
  
  
B. COMMON SENSE AND WITNESS EVALUATION  
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is thus great potential, if not for wholesale replacement of the necessity test with one 
based on helpfulness, then at least for the necessity test to be confined narrowly only to 
expert opinion as opposed to social framework evidence and/or to questions of witness 
credibility (as defined in Jenkins), as opposed to reliability (defined as all external factors 
affecting the ability of a witness to provide credible and reliable testimony). However, 
another means of challenging Gage is to question whether its prohibition on expert testimony 
on witness credibility and reliability absent ‘special features’ in fact flows from the 
application of the necessity requirement. Here, it is important to note that Lord Gill specifies 
that expert evidence must be necessary for a ‘sound conclusion’ or ‘proper resolution of the 
dispute’.69  A sound decision can be defined as one which is ‘free from error, fallacy, or 
misapprehension’.70  A ‘proper resolution’ of a dispute extends beyond a sound decision to 
encompass appropriate consideration of the values of the criminal justice system,  including 
not just those of lay adjudication, orality and the day in court idea which underpin the 
prohibition on experts on witness testimony, but also crucially for our purposes, the notion of 
‘principled asymmetry’71 which leads the law to ‘overprotect’72  criminal accused against 
unjust convictions through measures such as the allocation of the burden of proof, the 
criminal standard of proof, the right to silence, a right to legal representation, rules protecting 
suspects against unfair and oppressive police questioning, limits on the prosecution’s adversarial 
stance, prosecutorial duties of disclosure, the retention of exclusionary rules of evidence 
(abandoned in civil cases) and, for now at least, the corroboration requirement. Understood in 
this way, it is possible to argue that expert evidence on credibility and reliability is necessary 
even in the absence of special features of witnesses. 
 The High Court held otherwise because of its assumption that assessing the 
credibility and the reliability of witnesses is merely a matter of ‘life experience’ and 
‘common sense’.73 To some extent, this is belied by the number of miscarriages of justice 
flowing from mistaken misidentifications and lying prosecution witnesses which were not 
picked up by jurors and other fact-finders.74 However, it is notoriously difficult to gain an 
                                                          
68 Cf Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, p. 489, arguing that only Parliament can authorise trial by 
expert. 
69 [2011] HCJAC 40, para. 22 (emphases added).  
70 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sound (last 
accessed 24 August 2016 
71 P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, (2nd edn, 2010: OUP), p. 19  .   
72 D Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988: Princeton UP) 60-63; and see D Nicolson and J 
Blackie, ‘Corroboration in Scots Law: ‘archaic rule’ or ‘invaluable safeguard’?’, (2013) 17 Edin LR 152, for the 
reasons behind this overprotection. 
73 [2011] HCJAC 40, paras. 30 and 35, respectively. 
74 See also more generally on the limits to common sense in this regard: Mackay and Colman, ‘Excluding expert 
evidence … ’ ;  FE Raitt, ‘A new criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence?’ in H Reece (ed.), Law 
and Science: Current Legal Issues Volume 1 (1998: OUP), ?? especially at p. 157. 
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accurate idea of the extent of such failures.75 A more persuasive source of evidence on the 
issue lies in the wealth of psychological studies on the accuracy of fact-finders in evaluating 
witness credibility and reliability, to which we now turn.  
 
2. Credibility 
 
Starting with ‘in the moment’ assessments of witness believability, a major focus for study 
has been the ability of fact-finders to discern honesty from demeanour. Here, folk wisdom 
holds that people are betrayed by the three ‘communication channels’ of face, body and 
voice.76 Apparently, ‘from the United States across Europe, we look for a change in voice 
pitch, hesitations and speech errors, pauses, gaze aversion, fidgeting, smiling, and blinking.’77 
According to research, however, only some of these ‘common sense’ cues have a basis in 
reality. Given that facial cues are easily controlled, this is the least revealing communication 
channel. For instance, there is no evidence that liars are prone to averting their gaze or 
smiling less. More reliable signs emanate from the less controllable communication channels 
of body and voice. Thus, some studies reveal that liars frequently shift body posture and 
make fidgety feet and hand movements, though other studies reveal that liars tend to perform 
fewer body movements, particularly hand gesticulations. More consistently reliable is the 
tendency of liars to speak with raised voice pitch, more hesitantly and with greater speech 
errors.   
 Unfortunately, however, people pay most attention to faces and, after that, the body. 
And here, not only are some commonly assumed signs of lying misconceived, but even the 
more reliable signs may, in fact, be caused by the stress and anxiety involved in testifying in 
court. Ironically, it may be the worry that one is not being believed that leads to the signs 
associated with lying. Similarly, averting one’s gaze or other supposed indicia of lying, such 
as evasive or vague answers to questions may reflect shyness or different cultural norms – an 
endemic problem in immigration cases.78 Moreover, there are problems even with the more 
reliable cues. One is that they cannot be easily detected with the naked eye or ear, but require 
special training or equipment. Secondly, not everyone displays the same signs or reacts in the 
same way when anxious, guilty or lying. Accordingly, unless we know a particular person’s 
usual behaviour, we cannot assess the significance of the presence or absence of certain 
behavioural signs. For example, raised voice pitch may reflect anger or excitement rather 
than untruthfulness, or, as in one Australian case, a voice tremor turned out to be caused by a 
speech impediment rather than uneasiness as was assumed.79 Finally, practised liars can train 
themselves to avoid showing signs commonly thought to indicate untruthfulness. Even 
                                                          
75 See references cited at n. 5 above.  
76 The following discussion draws on A Kapardis, Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction (4th edn, 2014: 
CUP), chapter 8; M Stone, ‘Instant lie detection? demeanour and credibility in criminal trials’, [1991] Crim LR 
821; J McEwan, The Verdict of the Court: Passing Judgment in Law and Psychology (2003: Hart Publishing), 
pp. 94-117; OG Wellborn, ‘Demeanor’, (1991) 76 Cornell L Rev 1075; A Vrij, ‘The assessment and detection of 
deceit’, in D Carson and R Bull (eds), Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts (2nd edn, 2003: Wiley) 67; A 
Vrij, ‘Credibility assessments in a legal context’, in D Carson, R Milne, F Pakes, K Shalev, and A Shawyer, A 
(eds), Applying Psychology to Criminal Justice (2007: Wiley), 81; JA Blumenthal, ‘A wipe of the hands, a lick 
of the lips: the validity of demeanor evidence in assessing witness credibility’, (1993) 72 Nebraska Law Review 
1157. 
77 McEwan, ibid, p. 107.  
78 See for example, R Byrne, ‘Assessing testimonial evidence in asylum proceedings: guiding standards from the 
International Criminal Tribunals,’ (2007) 19 International Journal of Refugee Law 609. 
79 See P McClellan, ‘Who is telling the truth? Psychology, common sense and the law’, Local Courts of New 
South Wales Annual Conference 2006, available at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWJSchol/2006/14.pdf> (last accessed 1 November 2016 
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children learn at very young ages to lie effectively80.  In summary, ‘there is nothing like 
Pinocchio’s nose’81 which betrays liars. Consequently, it is not surprising that the studies in 
laboratories (where admittedly lying ‘witnesses’ are less likely to be affected by anxiety and 
guilt than in real-life situations) suggest that fact-finders have little more than an even chance 
of assessing witness honesty based only on demeanour.82 
 As regards other credibility cues which derive from the way witnesses testify,83 here 
studies suggest that common sense fares better in focusing primarily on the consistency of a 
witness’s account,84 the amount of detail provided, the witness’s speech-style (most notably 
whether it is in narrative as opposed to fragmented form85 and involves what is called 
‘powerful’ as opposed to ‘powerless’ speech)86 and above all87 witness confidence either 
expressly stated or inferred. Thus, recent research suggests that these factors do have some 
value as indicators of accuracy. For instance, the recall of events actually experienced, rather 
than imagined or the result of misleading suggestions, contain more contextual, spatial and 
sensory detail (time, place, colour and shapes), and are delivered more confidently, and with 
fewer verbal hedges, admissions of uncertainty and more reference to cognitive processing, 
such as what witnesses were thinking while observing facts. Unfortunately, however, 
experiments suggest that people are not particularly good at assessing accuracy from such 
‘reality monitoring’ clues.  
                                                          
80 See, for example, A Vrij and FW Winkel, ‘Detection of false statements in first and third-graders: the 
development of a nonverbal detection instrument’, in G Davies, S Lloyd-Bostock, K McMurran and C Wilson 
(eds), Psychology, Law, and Criminal Justice (1996: de Gruyter), 221 
81 Vrij, ‘The assessement … ‘, p. 68.  
82  Success rates have rarely been above 60%, with most studies reporting levels of between 45-60%: P Ekman 
and M O’Sullivan, ‘Who can catch a liar?’, (1991) 46 American Psychologist 913. 
83 See generally, EF Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1996: Harvard UP), chapter 2; BL Cutler and S Penrod, 
Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology and the Law (1995: CUP), chapters 12-13; see MR Leippe, 
‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony’, in DF Ross, JD Read, and MP Toglia (eds), Adult Eyewitness 
Testimony Current Trends and Developments (1994, CUP), 385.  
84 See Byrne, ‘Assessing testimonial evidence …’; J Cohen, ‘Questions of credibility: omissions, discrepancies 
and errors of recall in the testimony of asylum seekers’, (2002) 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 293; J 
McEwan, ‘Reasoning, relevance and law reform: the influence of empirical research on criminal adjudication’, 
in P Roberts and M Redmayne (eds), Innovations in Evidence and Proof: Integrating Theory, Research and 
Teaching (2007: Hart Publishing) 187, pp. 196-197;  M Boyce, J Beaudry and RCL Lindsay, ‘Belief of 
eyewitness identification evidence’, in RCL Lindsay, DF Ross, JD Read and MP Toglia (eds), The Handbook of 
Eyewitness Psychology: Volume II: Memory for People (2012: Psychology Press), 501,  pp. 510-511; 
85 Namely, a coherent uninterrupted account as opposed to one derived from questions and answers: see for 
example WM O’Barr, Linguistic Evidence: Language, Power and Strategy in the Courtroom (1982: Academic 
Press), especially pp. 76-83.[I can only find a 2014 edition; I can only access 1982 version in our library] 
86 With powerless speech being characterised by: the use of hedges, such as ‘it seemed’; modifiers like ‘sort of 
and ‘kind of’; hesitation forms like ‘um’; rising intonation as if seeking approval; repetition as an indication of 
insecurity; intensifiers, such as ‘very close friends’; frequent direct quotations as indicating a deference to 
others’ authority; polite forms of address; and empty adjectives such as ‘divine’ and ‘charming’: see eg O’ Barr, 
ibid; J M Conley WM O'Barr, and EA Lind ‘The power of language: presentational style in the courtroom’, 
(1978) 1978 Duke Law Journal 1375.   
87 Perceived witness confidence accounted for more than 50% of the variance in participants’ assessment of 
witness accuracy: see for example GL Wells, RC Lindsay, and T. Ferguson, ‘Accuracy, confidence, and juror 
perceptions in eyewitness identification’, (1979) 64 Journal of Applied Psychology 440; and see also Cutler and 
Penrod, Mistaken Identification , pp. 207-209; RCL Lindsay, ‘Expectations of eyewitness performance: Jurors' 
verdicts do not follow from their beliefs’, in Ross et al., Adult Eyewitness Testimony… , 362, p. 373Moreover, 
the impact of confidence is difficult to shake even when fact-finders are faced, as some real-life cases show, 
with conflicting evidence such as a confession by someone other than the accused or, as experiments show  
where confidence is debunked as an accurate clue by expert evidence: (MR Leippe, ‘The case for expert 
testimony about eyewitness memory’, (1995) 1 Psychology, Public Policy and Law 909, pp. 926 and 942, 
respectively), 
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In any event, these cues are less helpful in the much more common situation of 
assessing whether the recall of actually observed facts is mistaken and incomplete. Thus, 
witnesses with accurate memory of central details of events may remember few or no 
peripheral details.88 Peripheral details are also more susceptible to subsequent alteration, 
especially if witnesses are required to make repeated reports and are questioned closely on 
these details.89 Moreover, skilled questioners can easily induce witnesses into contradicting 
themselves. Conversely, even important details may be omitted from accounts because of 
their traumatic impact,90 embarrassment or other understandable reasons. Fact–finders thus 
ought to be very cautious about reading too much into reports which contain inconsistencies 
or lack detail, not least because witnesses with accurate recall of central details of events may 
make mistakes on peripheral details91 and consistent accounts may reflect an ability to 
organise information rather than a coherent memory. Similar caution also needs to be 
exercised in making inferences about witnesses who appear to lack confidence, or speak 
hesitantly, as this may be due to personality traits like shyness or due to gender, race, or class 
rather than unreliability. Unfortunately, research shows that people are influenced by the 
social origins of speakers as revealed by accent and the educational sophistication of the 
language used.92   
 As regards confidence, years of research reveals that, while it may be a reliable 
indicator of accuracy in certain circumstances, such as when witnesses are confident about 
one aspect of the facts but not others,93 and for out-of-court identifications rather than court-
room testimony, more commonly there is at best only a modest link between witness 
confidence and accuracy, sometimes no link at all, and in rare cases even a negative 
correlation.94 More worryingly, confidence can be artificially boosted by repeated 
questioning on issues on which witnesses have already provided information, asking 
witnesses to repeatedly think about their responses to questions, preparing witnesses for 
trials, and providing positive feedback on witness reports or when they pick out suspects.95 
Fortunately, the ban on investigating officers conducting VIPERs and traditional live line-ups 
(but not other forms of formal identification) prevent these line-up abuses, while the Lord 
Advocate’s Guidelines also require officers to take steps to prevent witnesses communicating 
with each other and thereby boosting confidence levels. On the other hand, confidence (or at 
least the appearance of it) can be reduced by aggressive cross-examination, as well as the 
general unfamiliarity of and stress associated with court and other legal proceedings.96 
Nevertheless, a recent summary of research on witness confidence concludes that it is a 
                                                          
88 Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, 63. 
89 J McEwan, ‘Reasoning, relevance and law reform ... ’, pp. 196-97. 
90 See Cohen, ‘Questions of credibility … ’.  
91 See for example GL Wells and MR Leippe, ‘How do triers of fact infer the accuracy 
of eyewitness identifications?  Using memory for peripheral detail can be misleading', (1981) 66 Journal of 
Applied Psychology 682. 
92 The classic study is H Giles and PF Powesland, Speech Style and Social Evaluation (1975:CUP).  
93 But even then there is a 15% error rate: HL Roediger, J Wixted , and KA Desoto, ‘The curious complexity 
between confidence and accuracy in reports from memory’ in L Nadel and WP Sinnott-Armstrong (eds), 
Memory and Law (2012: OUP), 84, p. 109. 
94 See for example, Roediger et al, ibid; JS Shaw, KS McLure and JA Dykstra, ‘Eyewitness confidence from the 
witnessed event through trial’, in MP Toglia, JD Read, DF Ross and RCL Lindsay (eds), The Handbook of 
Eyewitness Psychology: Volume 1: Memory for Events (2007: Psychology Press), 371; CAE Luus and GL 
Wells, ‘Eyewitness identification confidence … ‘, in Ross et al, Adult Eyewitness Testimony…. 223.More 
specific references are given below. 
95 See  for example RP Fisher and MC Reardon, ‘Eyewitness identification’, in Carson et al, Applying 
Psychology… ,  21, pp. 32-33; N Brewer, N Weber and C Semmler, ‘A role for theory in eyewitness 
identification research’, in Lindsay et al, The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology …, 201 pp. 213-214.  
96 McEwan, The Verdict of the Court … , p. 99; Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony … ’, p. 396. 
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relatively reliable but imperfect indicator of accuracy – at least in the absence of any possible 
sources of post-event memory and confidence manipulation – and pertinently, in relation to 
recognition and recall shortly after the relevant incidents rather than much later in court.97  
 More generally, we can conclude that reliance on witness confidence and speech-style 
and the consistency and detail of their accounts is not completely misguided, but will not 
necessarily lead to sound decisions, given their nuanced and sometimes misleading impact.  
 
3. Reliability  
 
A similarly nuanced picture applies to the extent to which common sense is sufficient to 
evaluate witness reliability. Admittedly, many studies of the factors that affect witness 
reliability merely confirm what many already know, for instance, that memory fades with 
time or children are less reliable witnesses than adults. However, such intuitions are unlikely 
to extend to the nuances of such phenomena, such as how memory fades or how soon 
children catch up with adults.98 Moreover, many phenomena discussed in Ferguson’s chapter 
(such as the impact of stress or the ineffectiveness of training on perceptual ability) are 
counterintuitive.  
 The apparent limits to common sense in assessing witness reliability are supported by 
numerous studies over more than thirty years, albeit predominantly in the sphere of 
eyewitness identification. Most commonly, subjects’ knowledge of the various factors 
affecting witnessing has been directly sought by asking them to identify from a choice of 
statements about witnessing, or simply to agree or disagree with such statements and then 
comparing answers with those of experts taking the same survey. While early surveys 
revealed an average agreement rate as low as 24%, lay subjects’ agreement with the experts 
has steadily increased,99 with an agreement rate as high as 80% in a recent survey.100 Gaining 
an overall picture of accuracy is, however, impossible because the surveys do not always 
focus on the same factors or use the same wording. However, a meta-analysis of 23 studies 
involving 4,669 respondents revealed an average agreement rate of 68% on 16 factors most 
commonly included in studies on which more than 80% of experts agreed.101 On some factors 
agreement was high – for instance over 80% on the impact of intoxication, pre-existing 
attitudes and expectations, and question wording, and the malleability of witness confidence,  
but on others relatively low – for instance less than 60% on weapon focus, the cross race 
effect on identification, and the link between witness confidence and accuracy.   
 Admittedly these surveys beg the question as to whether the experts’ views are 
themselves correct – even an 80% agreement rate between experts suggests room for doubt, 
while today’s psychological ‘truth’ can always become tomorrow’s ‘fallacy’.102  
                                                          
97 Roediger et al, ‘The curious complexity … ’,  especially pp. 111-112.  
98 Roberts, ‘Expert evidence on the reliability … ’, p. 101. 
99 Possibly due to increased knowledge of the issues caused, inter alia, by greater media focus on miscarriages 
of justice, but also because of the greater use of agree/disagree formats and more comprehensible 
questionnaires. 
100 See SL Desmarais and JD Read, ‘After 30 years, what do we know about what jurors know? A meta-
analytical review of lay knowledge regarding eyewitness factors’, (2011) 35 Law and Human Behavior 200. See 
also R S Schmechel, TP O'Toole, C Easterly, and EF Loftus, ‘Beyond the ken? Testing jurors’ understanding of 
eyewitness reliability evidence’, (2005-6) 46 Jurimetrics 177 , especially  p. 211, who found for instance that 
89% of respondents accepted that that even a witness who identifies the same person on multiple occasions 
could be wrong,but also that 46% of respondents wrongly thought memory operates like a video camera in 
relation to traumatic events  
101 Ibid.  
102 In addition, results always depend on the questions’ wording and subjects are never given what is usually the 
most accurate answer, namely that the impact of any factors usually depends in interactions with others: EB 
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Nevertheless, many of the lay misconceptions revealed by the surveys are replicated by 
studies which indirectly test lay knowledge by ascertaining how it is used in making 
decisions. One method involves presenting subjects with actual studies on the impact of 
various factors affecting witnessing accuracy and asking them to predict the outcome.103 
Other methods involve asking subjects either to identify factors which determine witness 
reliability in particular situations or to assess witness accuracy either directly or through 
delivering a verdict in response to situations presented in written descriptions, videotapes or 
even mock trials in which different witnessing factors are manipulated. All paint a far less 
optimistic picture of fact-finders’ abilities to make accurate assessment of witness testimony 
than the surveys where subjects can make educated or lucky guesses at the ‘correct’ response 
from the answers provided. Thus, even when prompted, participants in these studies tended to 
be insensitive to the impact of a wide variety of factors when assessing testimony, including 
those that the surveys suggest are relatively well-understood, such as the effect of lighting, 
stress, weapon focus, crime duration on perception and of delay104 between the incident and 
recall on memory, and most notably that of ‘system variables’.105 Furthermore, when subjects 
do take into account relevant factors, they sometimes apply them contrary to their actual 
effect or underestimate their impact.   
 While there are numerous problems with methodology and consistency of results, 
overall the studies are said to ‘converge’ on the broad findings that lay adjudicators have an 
incomplete and sometimes incorrect understanding of the factors which affect witness 
accuracy and that even when they correctly understand such factors, they do not necessarily 
incorporate them into their decision-making. This suggests that they have, at best, only a 
moderate ability to discern witness accuracy. For instance, in relation to identification 
evidence, studies repeatedly show that subjects are rarely able to outdo chance in assessing 
accuracy, with rates never rising above 61%.106 However, while such poor performance 
should lead fact-finders to wrongly reject accurate accounts as often as they wrongly accept 
inaccurate witness accounts, in fact study participants tend to overestimate the accuracy of 
eyewitness evidence, both as a general proposition in surveys107 and in indirect studies of 
witness evaluation.108 For instance, in one study,109 83.7% of subjects asked to assess the 
accuracy of witnesses overestimated the chances of them accurately identifying a suspect 
present in a line-up. Moreover, fact-finders’ faith in eyewitnesses may be very hard to shake, 
even in experiments when their evidence is discredited by an opposing lawyer.110 It is also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ebbesen and VJ Konečni, ‘Eyewitness memory research: probative v. prejudicial value’, (1996) 5 Expert 
Evidence 2, p. 19.  
103 Here again the ‘prediction studies’ are dependent on the validity of the findings the subjects are asked to 
predict as well as on how accurately studies are described to the subjects. 
104 But cf RCL Lindsay, ‘Expectations of eyewitness performance: jurors' verdicts do not follow from their 
beliefs’, in DF Ross et al (eds), Adult Eyewitness Testimony….  67. 
105 Cf Ferguson’s chapter in this volume on the difference between ‘system’ and ‘estimator’ variables. 
106 Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony … ’ , p. 925; Boyce et al, ‘Belief of eyewitness identification 
evidence … ’, pp. 506-507; DD Caputo and D Dunning, ‘Distinguishing accurate identifications from erroneous 
ones: Post-dictive indicators of eyewitness accuracy’, in Lindsay et al, The Handbook of Eyewitness 
Psychology, 427 pp. 442-443. 
107 Possibly because of a transference of most people’s confidence in their own abilities to others: cf Schmechel 
et al,  ‘Beyond the ken? … ’, p. 196 (77% of jurors surveyed rated their own memories as excellent). 
108 Cutler and Penrod, Mistaken Identification … , pp. 179 and 186. 
109 JC Brigham and RK Bothwell, ‘The ability of prospective jurors to estimate the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications’, (1983) 7 Law and Human Behavior 19. See also Boyce et al, ‘Belief of eyewitness 
identification evidence … ’ ,  508-509; Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony … ’, 388; MR Leippe 
and D Eisenstadt, ‘The influence of eyewitness expert testimony on jurors’ beliefs and judgments’, in BL Cutler 
(ed.), Expert Testimony on the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification (2009: OUP) 169, p. 171.  
110 See Cutler and Penrod, Mistaken Identification …  , pp. 191-195; Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness 
testimony … ’, pp. 930-1002.  
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possible that fact-finders’ confidence in witnesses and their lack of ability to accurately 
assess the factors influencing witness accuracy are linked in a vicious circle: because fact-
finders cannot assess testimony accurately they overestimate its accuracy and because they 
overestimate its accuracy they underestimate the impact of factors detracting from witness 
reliability.  
 
C. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND SOUND DECISIONS ON CREDIBILITY AND 
RELIABILITY  
 
1. Is psychological research on witnessing sufficiently reliable? 
 
The above analysis provides little support for Lord Gill’s assertion that fact-finders’ 
‘experience of life and human affairs’ render them capable of sound decisions on witness 
credibility and reliability. This opens the way to argue that expert testimony on the 
psychology of witnessing may be necessary or at least helpful in reaching such sound 
decisions. However, a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition for such testimony 
itself is that it is based on evidence which is ‘sufficiently reliable’; otherwise, as recognised 
in Young v HMA,111 it ‘will not assist the finder of fact in the proper determination of the 
issue’. According to Young, expert evidence must   
 
‘proceed on theories which have been tested (both by academic review and in practice) 
and found to have a practical and measurable consequence in real life. It must follow a 
developed methodology which is explicable and open to possible challenge, and it must 
produce a result which is capable of being assessed and given more or less weight in 
light of all the evidence before the finder of fact.’112 
  
As the first Scottish case to lay down a reliability requirement for the admission of expert 
evidence, it not surprising that it leaves many unanswered questions.113 Most114 of these are 
beyond the scope of this article because it can be argued that psychological research on 
witnessing is at least as reliable as much of that supporting many of the traditional forensic 
sciences accepted by the courts,115 which been given a ‘free pass’ in terms of the question of 
their reliability. Yet as psychological research on witnessing shows, such differential 
treatment between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences is difficult to justify116 
Thus, most of  the research on which psychological experts might rely has been peer-
reviewed and is based on  falsifiable hypotheses which have been tested through experiments 
designed to ensure ‘internal validity’ through isolation of study variables, exclusion of rival 
hypotheses, random selection of subjects, etc.117 More problematic  is the argument118 that the 
                                                          
111 [2013] HCJAC 145; 2014 SLT 21; 2014 SCL 98.  
112 Ibid, para. 54.  
113 However, the suggestion that all expert evidence much be based on an academic discipline rather experience 
has now been implicitly overruled in Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP, [2016] UKSC 6, para. 44 which states 
as one of the conditions for expert evidence admissibility that it is based on a ‘reliable body of knowledge or 
experience’) (emphasis added).   
114 But see below. 
115 Cf National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, (2009) 
available https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf (last accessed on 1 November 2016); compare 
Young v HMA, at para. 55.  
116 See, more generally, Faigman, ‘To have and have not … ’; and cf Raitt, ‘A new criterion … ’ , p. 153 on the 
law’s reluctance to engage with the reliability of social science research.  
117 The following discussion of the validity of the research draws on McEwan, The Verdict of the Court … 
chapter 7 and ‘Reasoning, Relevance,…,’;Cutler and Penrod, Mistaken Identification … , especially chapter 4; 
Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony … ‘, p. 83; R Bagshaw, ‘Behavioural science data in evidence 
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studies lack realism or in scientific jargon ‘external’ or ‘ecological’ validity, and hence their 
findings are not generalisable to ‘real’ life witnessing and witness evaluation. Due to cost, 
ethical constraints and the desire for strict control of the variables studied, studies often 
involve fairly artificial witnessing and witness evaluation experimental conditions. For 
example, even when witness evaluation studies involve video-taped trials rather than subjects 
reading witness testimonies or transcripts, such trials are heavily edited and devoid of the 
tensions and/or tedium of real trials, and the impact of the personalities and demeanour of 
legal actors and other factors prompting peripheral rather than central route processing.119 
Moreover, most studies are of individual decision-making, whereas juries decide collectively, 
and this may affect individual views. There are fewer problems with creating realistic 
witnessing conditions, though ethical considerations may limit, for example, the extent to 
which witnesses can be exposed to stressful and traumatic events, especially as victims. On 
the other hand, it can be noted that many witnesses are not involved in the incidents they 
observe, nor are most legal incidents violent, emotionally arousing or otherwise striking. 
Moreover, as noted by Ferguson, stress and other forms of emotional arousal can have 
negative as well as positive effects.120  
More generally, one can ask whether the fact that a theory has not been ‘found to have 
a practical and measurable consequence in real life’ should, for that reason alone, be refused 
admission as the High Court suggests. For one thing, the courts have long relied on many 
disciplines, such as pathology, whose theories are based on inference from first principles and 
practitioner experience cannot, for obvious reasons, be tested in real life,121 and others, like 
psychiatry, which are based on methods other than the paradigmatic scientific method of 
testing falsifiable hypotheses through controlled laboratory experiments.122  In addition, many 
laboratory experiments are increasingly being confirmed in field experiments which are 
conducted in real-life situations, and by some archival studies, where researchers look at the 
record of actual cases. Moreover, the vast majority of the findings cited in this and 
Ferguson’s chapter are supported by ‘multiple studies conducted in systematic programmes 
of research carried out by multiple investigators working independently of each other’ and 
involve ‘methodological variability across paradigms and investigators’.123 It would indeed 
be startling if, as Leippe and Eisenstadt note, ‘somehow, most experts are wrong about most 
eyewitness matters.’124 Conversely, there is little clear indication that real-life conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
teaching and scholarship’, in Roberts and Redmayne, Innovations in Evidence … ; J Copeland, ‘Helping jurors 
recognize the frailties of  eyewitness identification evidence’, (2002) 46 Criminal Law Quarterly 188, and the 
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Marcon ‘The need for expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification’, in Cutler, Expert Testimony 
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118 Eg Stone, Proof of Fact in Criminal Trials … , , chapter 1; Ebbesen and Konečni, ‘Eyewitness memory 
research; HD Flowe, et al., ‘Limitations of expert psychology testimony on eyewitness identification’ in Cutler, 
Expert Testimony … , 201; R Elliott, 'Expert testimony about eyewitness identification: a critique' (1993) 17 
Law and Human Behavior 423. 
119 See W Weiten and SS Diamond, ‘A critical review of the jury simulation paradigm: the case of 
defendant characteristics’, (1979) 3 Law and Human Behavior 71.  
120 Reference ?? 
121 See, for example, G Edmond and D Mercer, ‘Trashing “junk science”’, (1998) 3 Stanford Technology Law 
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122 See, for example, Faigman, ‘To have and have not … ’; AE Taslitz, 'Myself alone: individualizing justice 
through psychological character evidence', (1993) 52 MLR 1, pp. 30ff. 
123 Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony … ’,, p. 915.  
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make a difference to the phenomena observed, let alone what the direction of effect would be. 
It is one thing to say that laboratory conditions are unrealistic; quite another to say that real-
life conditions will cause an observed phenomenon to be reversed, negated or diminished 
rather than enhanced.  
Of course, if such evidence emerges, theories based on laboratory experiments need to be 
altered, just as when earlier findings are not replicated, or their details complicated, by later 
studies. But until evidence contradicting otherwise consistent and generally accepted research 
findings emerges, it seems better to take cognisance of the prima facie case for the existence 
of phenomena established by consistent laboratory findings, rather than ignore them because 
they might not be replicated in real life125 or are later found to require modification. These 
possibilities counsel for modesty in the claims of experts126 and for courts to assess the 
validity of individual psychological research findings, not for categorically rejecting all 
psychological expertise on witnessing. To dismiss all psychological findings for a lack of 
certainty would be to hold psychological research to higher standards than apply to the so 
called ‘hard sciences’ where scientists acknowledge that they (or at least their colleagues!)127 
are not capable of providing infallible and unchanging knowledge. More radically, post-
Kuhnian sociological studies of science argue that ‘the procedures and conclusions of science 
are, like all other cultural products, the contingent outcome of interpretive social acts’ and 
that ‘the factual as well as the theoretical assertions of science depend on speculative and 
socially derived assumptions’.128 In other words, truth claims are the product of negotiation 
within particular scientific communities, and the best we can expect in terms of reliability is a 
consensus amongst the scientific community based on consistent findings.129 Perhaps more 
pertinently, legal fact finders constantly rely on generalisations whose applicability and 
existential validity are far from certain. While it could be argued that this is unavoidable, 
unlike reliance on unproven psychological findings, it seems bizarre to reject the latter where 
this would leave fact-finders to rely on ‘fireside inductions’130 about human psychology 
which experts consistently find to be misplaced.131  
                                                          
125 In fact, it is arguable that evidence from actual cases can never trump laboratory experiments because we can 
only very rarely derive definitive answers from observing actual incidents. This, in turn, is because one cannot 
sufficiently control for the impact of independent variables outside experiments. More importantly, there is 
rarely verification of the truth of witness accounts to allow for inferences about the effect of witnessing 
conditions, or the accuracy of witnesses and evaluations of their reliability 
126 Faigman, ‘To have and have not … ’ pp. 1030 and 1051.  
127 BL Campbell, ‘Uncertainty as symbolic action in disputes among experts’, (1985) 15 Social Studies of 
Science 429.  
128 M Mulkay, ‘Knowledge and utility: implications for the sociology of knowledge’, (1979) 9 Social Studies of 
Science 63, p. 65.  
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general acceptance (Frye v United States 293 F. 1013 ( DC Cir 1923)).There are well-documented problems 
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fact that psychological researchers, as both academics carving out a relatively new discipline and potential hired 
experts, have an interest.. On the other hand, one wonders how capable the courts are of evaluating the validity 
of the methods, never mind the result, of unfamiliar disciplines as required by Young. Cf the criticism of the 
similar new US test (Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579 (1993) by, for example, SA Cole, 
‘Where the rubber meets the road: thinking about expert evidence as expert testimony’, (2007) 52 Villanova 
Law Review 803 . 
130 Cf PE Meehl, ‘Law and the fireside inductions: some reflections of a clinical psychologist’, (1971) 27 
Journal of Social Issues 65. 
131 Cf Roberts, ‘Expert evidence … ’, pp. 104-105; McEwan, The Verdict of the Court …, p. 8. 
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2. Can psychological experts assist fact-finders?  
 
However, even if it is accepted that fact-finders need help in reaching sound decisions on 
witness credibility and reliability, and that such help can be based on sufficiently reliable 
research findings, it still needs to be established that expert testimony will actually help fact-
finders, both in the abstract and when weighed against associated harms and other less 
harmful forms of assistance.  
 Looking at credibility first, here there seems to be little more experts can do than warn 
fact adjudicators about the difficulties of inferring credibility from demeanour and other clues 
relating to the way witnesses testify. Given the simplicity of such a message, this can quite 
easily be done by lawyers arguing the case and/or judges instructing juries. To provide more 
than a general ‘lecture’ on this topic (which at any rate, at least in the case of warnings about 
overvaluing confidence levels, do not seem to work)132 by commenting on or even just 
providing an explanation of the reliability (or lack thereof) of particular cues based on the 
way witnesses testify would require the expert’s presence in the court throughout the trial. In 
fact, the trial’s adversarial nature would require both prosecution and defence experts or a 
significant change in procedure to allow for a court-appointed commentator on witness 
credibility. In addition, there seems little point in informing jurors of the more reliable signs 
of lying if they cannot be detected by non-experts. And, even if courts were prepared to allow 
experts to sit in court and observe all witnesses, allowing experts to provide an opinion on 
whether they think a witness is credible would fundamentally alter the nature of the Scottish 
trial and go very far towards usurping the role of those appointed to find the facts, especially 
if experts have to use special equipment to detect demeanour clues. Thus, while the High 
Court was wrong to assert that the common sense and life experience of juries and other fact-
finders will ensure sound decisions on credibility, it does not seem worthwhile to use experts 
to help  make such assessments.  
Some psychological insiders argue for the same conclusion as regards the usability of 
expert evidence on reliability. Thus, whereas supporters of the use of experts assume that 
‘[w]hile a little knowledge can sometimes be a dangerous thing, it is rarely more dangerous 
than no knowledge at all’,133 critics argue that ‘a little learning is dangerous and ... a little 
more may be more dangerous still.’134 One reason given is that the impact of variables 
affecting witnessing is too often small or its contours too imprecise to justify being applied. 
For instance, while studies consistently find a cross-race effect for face identification,135 it is 
very small, and while longer exposure time clearly enhances memory of faces, the exact ratio 
between exposure time and memory improvement is unclear.136 Secondly, it is argued that 
even if we can be precise about the effect of some witnessing conditions, research can only 
report an average affect. For actual witnesses, this effect may be magnified, nullified or 
diminished because of other factors. The effect of some of these factors might be unknown, 
especially when it comes to variations in witnesses’ personalities. For example, stress clearly 
affects different people differently, whereas some elderly witnesses may have impeccable 
memories.137 Even where we are dealing with factors whose effect is known in isolation from 
                                                          
132 See Leippe, ‘The case for expert witnesses…, p. 942. 
133 Faigman, ‘To have and have not … ’, p. 1046.  
134 R Elliott, ‘Expert testimony … ‘, ’, p. 425. See also, for example, Ebbesen and Konečni, ‘Eyewitness 
memory research … ’ . cf however, Faigman, ‘To have and have not … ‘, p. 1047: ‘[w]hile a little knowledge 
can sometimes be a dangerous thing, it is rarely more dangerous than no knowledge at all.’ 
135 See Ferguson (this volume), chapter ??.  
136 Cutler and Penrod, Mistaken Identification …  , p. 101 
137 On the capacities of elderly witnesses, see, for example, DJ LaVoie, HK Mertz and TL Richmond, ‘False 
memory susceptibility in older adults: implications for the elderly eyewitness’ in Toglia et al, The Handbook of 
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others or the way in which they combine with some other factors (for instance that longer 
witness exposure to an event mitigates the speed and extent of memory loss), there are simply 
too many variables potentially affecting witness accuracy to allow for any ‘scientific’ 
prediction.  
 These are valid points, but it can be noted that the courts are content to allow experts to 
provide opinions on the reliability of those with special features, even though such features 
might be exacerbated or mitigated by other factors to which fact-finders are not alerted. So, 
once it is recognised that expert evidence is not validly confined to ‘special features 
pertaining to a witness or to his evidence’138 or that consistently observed factors affecting 
reliability constitute such special features, the way is open to admitting an opinion on the 
impact on individual factors, at least if they have more than a minimal impact.  This could 
even be extended to an opinion based on the consistently observed combined effect of 
factors, though as one moves from two to more factors, such an opinion becomes increasingly 
speculative. But where a witness’s reliability is likely to have been affected by too many 
different factors or where there are only a few but their impact on each other is unknown, 
expert testimony could be confined to merely providing juries with an idea of the observed 
impact of each relevant factor, the possible size of impact and that other factors might 
mitigate or enhance these factors. As long as experts make it clear that some effects are 
smaller than others,139 that particular findings have been challenged or may lack ecological 
validity, and that there may be many different witnessing conditions which affect accuracy, 
such social framework evidence can be argued to play an important role in educating fact-
finders about the factors affecting witnessing and cautioning them about over-estimating 
witness accuracy without coming close to usurping the court’s fact-finding function.  
 
3. Are the benefits of expert testimony outweighed by the harms?  
 
It is, however, still arguable that even if the information is useful in the abstract, exposure to 
a plethora of relevant findings, but with no means of weighing them up against each other 
and applying them to the case before them, might lead to fact-finders becoming confused or 
paralysed by information overload, especially if exposed to the minutiae of research and, as 
Lord Gill noted,140 battles of the experts. This, in turn, may lead them to abandon attempts to 
evaluate witness accuracy in terms of its content, and focus instead on irrelevant and 
misleading credibility cues such as witnesses’ status or attractiveness, and whether they look 
questioners in the eye.141 Leaving aside the question of whether it is better to run the risk of 
confusing fact-finders than allowing them to labour under misapprehensions about witness 
testimony,142 it can be noted that evidence for such ‘peripheral route processing’143 is 
confined to lay rather than professional fact-finders, who presumably will be far more likely 
to focus on the more valuable content and witness reliability based cues involved in ‘central 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Eyewitness Psychology … 605; and CJA Moulin, RG Thompson, DB Wright, and MA Conway, ‘Eyewitness 
memory in older adults’, in ibid, 627.  
138 Gage, para 22.  
139 Even though this might negate the impact of their evidence, as has occurred in mock jury studies: see Elliott, 
‘Expert testimony … ’, p. 433. 
140 Gage, para. 32 
141 See Leippe, ‘The appraisal of eyewitness testimony … ’, pp. 391-392; C Fife-Schaw, ‘The influence of 
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route processing’. Moreover, expert warnings about overestimating witness accuracy and 
relying on common sense signs of witness accuracy and honesty may have the effect of 
encouraging lay fact-finders to concentrate on the content of testimony.   
 In any event it is noteworthy that worries about juror confusion – like those of jurors 
being dazzled by experts’ credentials and ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness’144 
are not regarded as dispositive when it comes to forensic and other so-called ‘hard’ science 
experts who carry much greater epistemological authoritativeness than those from the ‘soft’ 
sciences.145 More importantly, decades of US research suggests that fact-finders, including 
jurors in actual cases, do not simply defer to experts nor are necessarily paralysed by 
competing experts, but attempt to weigh the merits of their evidence in the context of the case 
as a whole and do so with reasonable but by no means prefect competence.146  
 Studies have also addressed the specific effect of exposing mock fact-finders to 
research findings by experts.147  Ideally, such exposure should make fact-finders more likely 
to accept accurate, and less likely to accept inaccurate, evidence. Initially, such a ‘sensitivity 
effect’ only rarely appeared in the relatively large number of experiments involving expert 
evidence. Instead, some showed no effect at all, whereas most resulted in heightened disbelief 
in witness testimony, irrespective of its accuracy.148  However, other studies149 have shown 
less of this latter ‘scepticism effect’ and more of a sensitivity effect, at least when experts 
tailored their testimony to the case rather than providing an overview of all research findings. 
 In any event, given fact-finders’ tendency to overestimate witness accuracy, one can 
ask whether general scepticism (as in Lord Gill’s climate of disbelief)150 is so undesirable. 
According to Leippe and Eisenstadt,151 scepticism occurs usually when it should (for 
example, when witness testimony is both central to the case and weak) and only sometimes 
when it should not. Moreover, it is arguable that where such scepticism relates to prosecution 
as opposed to defence witnesses, it is in fact desirable given both the general over-estimation 
of witness reliability by fact-finders and the law’s adoption of ‘principled asymmetry’152 in 
favour of ‘overprotecting’ criminal accused.153  
 If so, it can be argued that while expert evidence might not ensure a sound decision 
understood solely in terms of accuracy, it may contribute to a proper resolution of the dispute 
in terms of accepted criminal justice values. For this reason, it is arguable that expert 
testimony on witness reliability should be confined to situations where the possible impact of 
common sense assumptions about witnessing is likely to lead to patent injustice to an 
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accused.154 Even if there remain doubts about the effectiveness of expert testimony on 
witness reliability155 the cautionary principle suggests that, if there is any potential for experts 
to safeguard the accused against unsafe convictions based on the failure to make sound 
decisions about witness reliability, they should be used. A similar response can be directed at 
the worry expressed by the High Court that expert testimony will substantially extend the 
length of trials,156 especially if each side  calls its own psychological experts, and courts have 
to spend time deciding whether their testimony is based on sufficiently reliable research 
findings. 
 
4. Are there better alternatives to psychological experts?   
 
On the other hand, these costs and the other risks associated with psychological – and indeed 
all – experts (their propensity to dazzle, confuse or engender undue scepticism) can still be 
dispositive if they can be shown, as the High Court assumed,157 to be unnecessary due to 
safeguards against reliance on unreliable evidence in the form of judicial instruction and 
cross-examination.  
We have already argued that warnings about the unreliability of demeanour and other 
credibility clues can just as easily – and certainly more efficiently –  be provided by lawyers 
and judges given the simplicity of the message involved. But what about reliability? Here, 
such a role can only be played by judges and lawyers if their knowledge of the psychology of 
witnessing is a lot more advanced than that of US judges and lawyers. Thus, while their 
performance has not been subjected to the more insightful means of indirect testing, neither 
judges nor lawyers performed better than lay subjects in survey studies of their knowledge of 
factors affecting witnessing.158 Indeed, in one survey, law students performed better than 
judges with years of legal experience.159 
 Consequently, the effectiveness of these safeguards requires the proper training of all 
professional adjudicators and lawyers involved in the criminal justice system. Indeed, this 
seems desirable whatever role psychological experts might play.160 In the case of judges, the 
only problems are ones of cost and possible resistance from judges who might think that they 
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have nothing to learn from psychology. Law schools will, however, understandably resist 
adding to an already crammed compulsory curriculum, and thus this safeguard is dependent 
on lawyers being sufficiently dedicated to clients to find the time to undertake the necessary 
research on witness reliability.  
But even assuming that judges and lawyers are exposed to relevant knowledge about 
the reliability of witnesses, their knowledge is likely to be less current than psychological 
experts. This is not necessarily problematic, as the law is appropriately cautious about using 
new findings before they become accepted wisdom, lest they prove to be idiosyncratic. 
Arguably, however, experts are also likely to be seen to be and, given their overriding duty to 
truth and the court rather than  
those calling them, to actually be, more impartial than those of counsel, as well as more 
authoritative than both lawyers and judges. More importantly, they will be able to provide a 
far more comprehensive, accurate and nuanced picture of research findings on witness 
reliability, especially if their views are probed by opposing counsel, judges and other fact 
adjudicators. Consequently, experts would seem to be the most effective means of 
contributing to sound decisions on witness reliability, even when appropriately trained judges 
sit without juries.  
  These predictions are supported by research which suggests that cross-examination 
rarely counters the impact of eyewitness testimony161 and is ‘largely useless’ for detecting 
truthful but mistaken witnesses162 – no doubt because it is not aimed at helping fact-finders to 
evaluate testimony accurately, but at undermining unfavourable, and strengthening 
favourable, testimony, and its impact may well owe more to cross-examination ability than 
witness accuracy. Particularly in a criminal justice system where many legal aid defence 
lawyers are underfunded and overworked, judicial instructions are a potentially more 
effective safeguard. But here also the research does not suggest much cause for optimism 
about the positive effect of judicial warnings as to potentially unreliable evidence and the 
factors affecting reliability.163 Like jury instructions in general,164 they may not be 
sufficiently comprehensible to be effective and are delivered at the end of trials when juror 
minds may already be made up or where jurors are struggling to cope with information 
overload. Unsurprisingly, the few studies that have been undertaken reveal that jury 
instructions have little impact, and certainly less than that of expert witnesses, and that when 
they do have an impact, they tend to engender scepticism rather than sensitivity.165 
Admittedly, these studies suffer from problems of external validity and use US jury 
instructions, which lack sufficient relevant information. But, while better-designed studies 
and improved jury instructions may in the future reveal – and, according to Leverick,166 are 
already revealing –  a more positive impact, currently there is some justification for thinking 
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that the best means of assisting  fact-finders to make sound decisions about witness reliability 
is through expert evidence.167 Certainly, it has been shown to produce a sensitivity rather than 
just a scepticism effect, and experts who may precede and specifically refer to relevant 
problems of witness testimony, are likely to be able to convey specialist knowledge better 
than judges and lawyers, and are always open to adversarial challenge.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have argued that the categorical exclusion of all experts on the psychology 
of witnessing as unnecessary for the proper resolution of disputes is based on an application 
of the wrong test for admissibility and, in any event, a misapplication of that test given what 
is known about the nature of witnessing and the evaluation of witnesses. Instead of a 
necessity test, we have argued in favour of a test of helpfulness or assistance (supported by 
Kennedy,168 at least in relation to social framework as opposed to opinion evidence) which 
justifies the reception of expert evidence if it would improve the soundness of fact-finders’ 
decisions. Then, in looking at the admissibility of psychological experts, we looked at a 
number of factors, all of which can be brought under a helpfulness test of admissibility. Thus, 
in order to be admissible it can be argued that all expert evidence must be reliable, usable, 
more helpful than harmful and, to the extent that any assistance carries associated risks and 
other costs, not available in a less costly form.169    
 Applying this test to the specific case of experts on the psychology of witnessing, we 
argued that there is little value and overriding system-based problems with calling experts on 
issues of credibility. On the other hand, absent extensive exposure to the research on 
psychology of witnessing which is impossible to provide in the case of jurors, there is an 
argument for admitting opinion evidence of psychological experts on the reliability of 
witnesses in limited circumstances, and a much greater role for expert testimony as a form of 
social framework evidence.  
 At the very least, we hope to have shown that, even if the conclusion in Gage on the 
admissibility of psychological experts is correct, it is not correct for the right reasons. If such 
evidence is to be excluded it should be on the grounds that, as things currently stand, the 
research lacks sufficient external validity or precision to be helpful, in which case there is 
always the possibility that these problems will be overcome as research continues. But we 
have argued that it is wrong to hold that expert evidence on the psychology of witnessing is 
never necessary for sound or proper decision-making unless the special features exception 
applies, that other safeguards are adequate, and that the practical costs of such evidence 
outweigh its benefits. Such reasoning suggests a judiciary ignorant of the true nature of the 
psychology of witnesses (thus ironically suggesting that common sense and lived experience, 
even of lawyers and judges, are not sufficient bases to adequately inform witness evaluation). 
Alternatively, or in addition, it suggests an excessive judicial zeal to uphold the assumed 
                                                          
167 As argued for both by psychologists ( for example, Copeland,  Helping jurors … ‘; Leippe, ‘The Case for 
Expert Witnesses… ‘;Cutler, et al, ‘The need for expert psychological testimony… ‘), and legal commentators 
(for example, MacLeod and Sheldon, ‘From normative to positive data … ’;  Stein, ‘The admissibility of expert 
testimony … ’; O’Hagan, ‘When seeing is not believing … ’; Heaton-Armstrong et al, Analysing Witness 
Testimony … ; D Ormerod and A Roberts, ‘The admissibility of expert evidence … ’, in Heaton-Armstrong et 
al, Witness Testimony… 401, p.  408. 
168 Kennedy v Cordia (Services) LLP para 41. 
169 For similar approaches, see Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence , pp. 487-48 (noting that helpfulness 
has both a positive and negative aspect); T M Massaro, ‘Experts, psychology, credibility, and rape: the rape 
trauma syndrome issue and its implications for expert psychological testimony’, [1985] 69 Minnesota Law 
Review 395, p. 432. But see Raitt, ‘A new criterion … ’, especially p. 154 where she argues that reliability 
subsumes helpfulness rather than vice versa. 
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value of lay adjudication and with it the authority of all judicial fact-finders and far less 
concern to ensure that criminal accused are only convicted on as reliable evidence as 
possible. How these competing issues are to be balanced is, of course, a complex question 
which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Hopefully, however, our argument that the 
necessity test and its application to exclude psychological research on witnessing is 
unpersuasive will clear the ground for a more principled debate about the proper role of all 
experts in a system which simultaneously values factual truth, the protection of the criminal 
accused, lay adjudication and the efficient resolution of disputes.   
 
 
 
 
